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Abstract
The ambient calculus is a calculus of computation that allows active processes to communicate
and to move between sites. A site is said to be a protective "rewall whenever it denies entry
to all attackers not possessing the required passwords. We devise a computationally sound test
for validating the protectiveness of a proposed "rewall and show how to perform the test in
polynomial time. The "rst step is the de"nition of a #ow logic for analysing the #ow of control
in mobile ambients; it amounts to a syntax-directed speci"cation of the acceptability of a control
#ow estimate. The second step is to de"ne a hardest attacker and to determine whether or not
there exists a control #ow estimate that shows the inability of the hardest attacker to enter; if
such an estimate exists, then none of the in"nitely many attackers can enter unless they contain
at least one of the passwords, and consequently the "rewall cannot contain any trap doors.
c© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The ambient calculus is a calculus of computation that is based on traditional pro-
cess algebras (such as the -calculus [15]). The main focus is not on communication,
however, but on the ability of active processes to move between sites representing
administrative domains; the calculus thereby extends the notion of mobility found in
Java [13] where only passive code can be moved between sites. Both processes and
sites are modelled as ambients; their ability to move around is governed by the capa-
bilities possessed. The calculus was introduced in [7] and has been studied extensively
[6, 8, 9, 14, 18, 19, 22]. We refer to Section 2 for a review of the ambient calculus.
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Since processes may evolve when moving around, the structure of a system of
ambients is very dynamic. In Section 3 we therefore develop a control #ow analysis
[17] for predicting the set of processes that may turn up inside a given ambient. This
takes the form of de"ning a #ow logic [16] for checking whether or not a control #ow
estimate (as might have been produced by a control #ow analysis) is indeed acceptable;
in the absence of higher-order features in the ambient calculus, this amounts to a syntax-
directed de"nition of a number of judgements. The analysis combines the ability to
handle communication (in the manner of analyses for the -calculus [2, 3]) with the
ability to handle movement (in the manner of an analysis for the communication-
free fragment [18]). Semantic correctness is established by proving that all acceptable
analyses are semantically sound (by means of a subject-reduction result in the manner
of type systems).
On the algorithmic side we show that there always is a least control #ow estimate
and that it can be computed in cubic time; this takes the form of generating a set of
constraints that is then solved by a worklist algorithm [17].
In [7] the communication-free fragment of the ambient calculus is used to model
and study a "rewall where only agents knowing the required passwords are supposed
to enter; indeed, assuming fairness, it is shown that all agents making correct use of
all the passwords will in fact enter. However, in the interest of security and safety of
systems, it is at least as important to ensure that an attacker not knowing any of the
passwords cannot possibly enter; we shall say that the "rewall is protective when this
is the case. As an example, a protective "rewall cannot contain trap doors or other
ways of circumventing the protection oEered by the passwords.
The diFculty of course is, that there are an in"nity of attackers that do not know the
passwords, and that it seems infeasible (and indeed undecidable) to perform automatic
tests that will guard against all of these. To overcome these problems we change in
Section 4 the “level of granularity” of our observations to coincide with those of the
control #ow analysis. We then prove that there is a process, called a hardest attacker,
such that:
If there exists a control #ow estimate that shows the inability of the hardest
attacker to enter, then none of the in"nitely many attackers can enter unless they
contain at least one of the passwords.
The ability to identify hardest attackers is perhaps comparable to the ability to identify
hardest problems in given complexity classes. To argue the case in less technical jargon,
consider the following “folk theorem”:
Testing 1 can prove the presence of bugs but never their absence.
Unfortunately, this has lead to the wide-spread belief that no experimentation with
software can be used for formally validating software. The technical results presented
here, generalising those of [18], provide a concrete instance of the rather diEerent, and
more useful, insight:
1 Testing in the sense of dynamically running a program on a number of inputs.
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Table 1
Abstract syntax
P ::= (n)P Restriction
| 0 Inactivity
| P |P′ Composition
| !P Replication
| Nla [P] Ambient
| M: P Movement
| 〈M〉lc Output of capability
| 〈〈N 〉〉ln Output of name
| (xc ): P Input of capability
| ((un )): P Input of name
M ::= inl
i
N Enter N
| outloN Exit N
| openlpN Open N
| x Variable
|  Null
| M:M ′ Path
N ::= n Name
| u Variable
Testing 2 can prove the absence of bugs but never their presence.
Expanding the area of applicability of this insight will likely lead to fundamental
changes in the validation of software used in security oriented applications. The ability
to extend the analysis to the existing software base, perhaps involving legacy code of
“unknown” origin, oEers a level of guarantee well above that of other formal
approaches.
2. Mobile ambients
Syntax. The presentation of the ambient calculus as given in [7] actually de"nes a
“pre-syntax” for ambients. One aspect of this is that not all the de"ned ambient ex-
pressions are meaningful and hence a type system [8] is needed to rule out the undesired
elements; the other aspect is that some of the clari"cations made in the type system
could in fact equally well be performed in the abstract syntax. To avoid the arti"cial
problem of devising semantics and static analysis for blatantly meaningless expressions
we shall use a slightly more re"ned syntax that makes some of the distinctions of the
type system.
The syntax of ambients in Table 1 is built around three syntactic categories: a class of
processes, ranged over by P ∈Proc, a class of capabilities, ranged over by M ∈Cap,
and a class of namings, ranged over by N ∈Nam. We follow [7] in distinguishing
between names (introduced by the restriction operator known from process algebras)
and variables (introduced by input statements); we also distinguish between variables
used for holding capabilities, ranged over by x∈Varc, and variables used for holding
names, ranged over by u∈Varn. We explain the constructs below.
First we consider processes (ignoring the superscript annotations in Table 1). Bor-
rowing from the -calculus [15] local scope is managed using the restriction operator.
Also there is the inactive process, the parallel composition of two processes and a
2 Testing in the sense of statically analysing a program on a number of inputs.
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Fig. 1. Pictorial representation of the basic reduction rules.
replicated process that is allowed to unfold to arbitrarily many (“in"nitely many”)
copies of the process. The next two constructs are unique to the ambient calculus.
An ambient is a process operating inside a named border. Movement of ambients is
governed by capabilities (explained below) and includes the ability for an ambient to
move out of an enclosing ambient and for an ambient to move into a sibling ambient.
Output of capabilities and names is much as in the -calculus except that the chan-
nel is implicit and embedded in the enclosing ambient itself. Similarly for input of
capabilities and names. As usual, trailing inactive actions will often be omitted from
examples.
Next, we consider capabilities and namings (once more ignoring the superscript
annotations in Table 1). The in-capability directs the enclosing ambient to enter a
sibling named N ; this is illustrated in Fig. 1 and will be explained in detail when we
consider the semantics below. The out-capability directs the enclosing ambient to move
out of its parent named N . The open-capability dissolves the border around a sibling
ambient named N . Since capabilities can be communicated we also need variables
ranging over them. Capabilities include the null capability as well as the sequential
composition of capabilities describing a path to the desired destination. Namings are
names but since they can be communicated we also need variables ranging over them.
Annotations. Let us now return to the two kinds of superscript annotations used in the
syntax of Table 1. One class of annotations is composed of the stable names, ranged
over by ∈SNam, for names occurring in restrictions, and the binders, ranged over by
c ∈Bndc and n ∈Bndn, for variables occurring in input actions; we occasionally use
∈Bnd=Bndc ∪ Bndn. These annotations are necessary for our analysis because the
semantics of the ambient calculus borrows from the -calculus in allowing -conversion
of bound names and variables. As an example, suppose we consider the ambient
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system
(n)(m)n[m[0]]
and that our control #ow estimate correctly says that m occurs inside n but not vice
versa; unfortunately, this makes little sense since -conversion allows us to change the
above ambient system to
(m)(n)m[n[0]]
and now the control #ow estimate is no longer correct. To circumvent this problem we
ensure that control #ow estimates always refer to stable names and binders. Continuing
the example, when we consider
(nN)(mM)n[m[0]]
we say that M occurs inside N; this then remains correct for the -converted system
(mN)(nM)m[n[0]]
since stable names are never changed by -conversion. Indeed, one way to understand
the distinction between names and stable names is to regard the stable names as static
representations of the names arising dynamically. The considerations for variables and
binders are analogous.
The other class of annotations used in Table 1 are the labels. They assist in develop-
ing the control #ow analysis by being able to precisely pin-point program points inside
the ambient system; for this purpose it would be natural to let all labels be distinct
since indeed all program points are distinct. As an example, in a system like
n[m1[inm] |m2[out n]]
this will allow us to distinguish the two occurrences of an ambient named m. As we
shall see, labels allow us to control the complexity (and precision) of the analysis by
treating one or more program points alike; for this purpose it may be appropriate only
to use a few labels. Indeed, one way to understand the use of labels is to regard labels
as amalgamations of a number of program points.
We use l∈Lab to range over the set of labels. More speci"cally, we view labels as
being de"ned by
Lab = Laba ∪ Labi ∪ Labo ∪ Labp ∪ Labc ∪ Labn
and use la ∈Laba to annotate ambients, li ∈Labi to annotate in-capabilities, lo ∈Labo
to annotate out-capabilities, lp ∈Labp to annotate open-capabilities, lc ∈Labc to an-
notate the output of capabilities, and ln ∈Labn to annotate the output of names.
We shall assume that the sets of labels, Lab, stable names, SNam, binders for the
input of capabilities, Bndc, and binders for the input of names, Bndn, are pairwise
disjoint. It may aid the intuition to assume that the diEerent sets of labels, listed
above, are also pairwise disjoint. Finally, we assume that all the sets mentioned are
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non-empty; for any given program they can always be assumed to be "nite since the
semantics below does not create new labels, stable names or binders.
We write fn(P) for the set of free names of P and similarly for M and N . Similarly
we write fv(P) for the set of free variables of P (and similarly for M and N ); a
process is closed whenever it has no free variables, i.e. fv(P)= ∅, but may of course
contain free names. Let n? be a distinguished name and l? a distinguished label; then
the programs of interest are ambients of the form nl?? [P?] where P? is closed, where
n? =∈ fn(P?) and where l? does not occur in P?.
Example 1. Consider the following example from [7] for illustrating how an agent
crosses a "rewall using the prearranged passwords (or secret keys) k, k′ and k′′:
Firewall: (ww)wA[kB[out1w: in2k′: in3w] | open4k′: open5k′′:P]
Agent: k′C[open6k: k′′D[Q]]
The program of interest is nl?? [Firewall |Agent]. We use typewriter font for names,
italics for stable names, roman for ambient labels, and numbers for labels of
capabilities.
Semantics. The semantics is given by a structural congruence relation P≡Q and a
reduction relation P→Q in the manner of the -calculus. The congruence relation is
inductively de"ned by the axioms and rules of Table 2; apart from a few diEerences
noted below it is a straightforward modi"cation of a table in [7]. The axioms and rules
in the left hand column ensure that the relation is an equivalence relation, that it is a
congruence, that parallel composition is commutative and associative with the inactive
process as a unit; they also describe the behaviour of replication.
The rules and axioms in the right hand column of Table 2 allow us to change the
placement of restriction operators. In the axiom for (nn)(mm)P we have added the
side condition “if n =m” to ensure that the association between names and stable names
is not modi"ed by the structural congruence. Next, we have axioms for -conversion;
here we write P{n←m} for the process that is as P but with all free occurrences of
n replaced by m (taking care to -convert so as to avoid the capture of m by any
restriction operator). The "nal two axioms control the expansion of capabilities.
The reduction relation is inductively de"ned by the axioms and rules of Table 3. It
is as in [7] and a pictorial representation of the "ve basic axioms is given in Fig. 1.
The remaining rules ensure that reduction can take place in the contexts of restrictions,
ambients and parallel compositions and that the structural congruence can freely be
used to rearrange ambient expressions. Note that no internal reduction can take place
“inside” movement or input pre"xes. Also note that in each reduction, exactly one of
the basic axioms is used.
Example 2. We have the following sequence of reduction steps for nl?? [Firewall
|Agent]; in each step we have underlined the capability to be executed next and we
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Table 2
Structural congruence
P≡P
P≡Q ∧ Q≡R⇒ P≡R
P≡Q ⇒ Q≡P
P≡Q ⇒ (n)P≡ (n)Q
P≡Q ⇒ P |R≡Q |R
P≡Q ⇒ !P≡ !Q
P≡Q ⇒ Nl[P]≡Nl[Q]
P≡Q ⇒ M: P≡M:Q
P≡Q ⇒ (xc ): P≡ (xc ): Q
P≡Q ⇒ ((un )): P≡ ((un )): Q
P |Q≡Q |P
(P |Q) |R≡P | (Q |R)
P | 0≡P
!P≡P | !P
!0≡ 0
(n)0≡ 0
(nn )(mm )P≡ (mm )(nn )P
if n 	= m
(n)(P |Q)≡P | (n)Q
if n =∈ fn(P)
(n)(ml[P])≡ml[(n)P]
if n 	=m
(n)P≡ (m)(P{n←m})
if m =∈ fn(P) (-renaming)
(x
c
): P≡ (x′c ): (P{x← x′})
if x′ =∈ fv(P) (-renaming)
((u
n
)): P≡ ((u′n )): (P{u← u′})
if u′ =∈ fv(P) (-renaming)
(M:M ′): P≡M:M ′: P
: P≡P
Table 3
Reduction relation
P→Q ⇒ (n)P→ (n)Q
P→Q ⇒ nl[P]→ nl[Q]
P→Q ⇒ P |R→Q |R
P≡P′
P′→Q′
Q′≡Q

⇒ P→Q
nl1 [inl2m: P |Q] |ml3 [R]→ml3 [nl1 [P |Q] |R]
ml1 [nl2 [outl3m: P |Q] |R]→ nl2 [P |Q] |ml1 [R]
openl1n: P | nl2 [Q]→P |Q
(x): P | 〈M〉l→P{x←M}
((u)): P | 〈〈N 〉〉l→P{u←N}
have assumed that w =∈ fn(Q).
nl?? [(w
w)wA[kB[out1w: in2k′: in3w] | open4k′: open5k′′: P] | k′C[open6k: k′′D[Q]]]
→ nl?? [(ww)(kB[in2k′: in3w] | wA[open4k′: open5k′′: P] | k′C[open6k: k′′D[Q]])]
→ nl?? [(ww)(wA[open4k′: open5k′′: P] | k′C[kB[in3w] | open6k: k′′D[Q]])]
→ nl?? [(ww)(wA[open4k′: open5k′′: P] | k′C[in3w | k′′D[Q]])]
→ nl?? [(ww)[wA[open4k′: open5k′′: P | k′C[k′′D[Q]]]]
→ nl?? [(ww)wA[open5k′′: P | k′′D[Q]]]
→ nl?? [(ww)wA[P |Q]]
The transition sequence shows that the "rewall (which has the private name w) sends
out the pilot ambient named k; since the agent knows the right passwords, and is in the
right form, the pilot ambient can enter the agent and then guide it inside the "rewall.
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Properties of the semantics. Recall that the programs of interest are ambients of the
form nl?? [P?] where P? is closed (and hence contains no free variables but may con-
tain free names), n? =∈ fn(P?) and P? does not contain l?. It follows that only closed
expressions are reduced and that no new names become free and that no new labels
come into existence. Because of the structural congruence it is not the case that pro-
grams evolve into programs (in particular processes of the form nl?? [· · ·]); to achieve
this we could restrict the use of the congruence in the semantics. Instead, we shall use
the following result showing that programs evolve into processes that are congruent to
programs.
Fact 1. Programs evolve to programs (modulo the congruence):
If P is congruent to a program and P→∗ Q then also Q is congruent to a
program.
Proof. We "rst investigate what it means for a process to be congruent to a program.
For this we extend the syntax of Table 1 with
T ::= (n)T
| 0
| T |T ′
| !T
| L: T
L ::=  |L:L′
S ::= (n)S if n = n?
| S |T
| T | S
| nl?? [P] if nl?? [P] is a program
| L: S
Let Triv be the set of processes described by T and let Ser be the set of processes
described by S; the former clearly contains the inactive process 0 and the latter clearly
contains all programs. We now show that Triv, respectively Ser, is the closure of the
set {0}, respectively the set of programs, under the congruence.
It is immediate to prove by induction in L that L: T ≡T and L: S ≡ S. It is also
immediate to prove by induction in T that T ≡ 0; hence all processes in Triv are
congruent to 0. Furthermore, by induction in S one can show that S ≡ nl?? [P] for some
P such that nl?? [P] is a program; hence all processes in Ser are congruent to programs.
For the opposite inclusions we prove that if P≡Q and P ∈Triv then Q∈Triv, and
similarly that if P≡Q and Q∈Triv then P ∈Triv, by induction in the inference; it
follows that Triv is the set of processes that are congruent to 0. Next we prove that if
P≡Q and P ∈Ser then Q∈Ser, and similarly that if P≡Q and Q∈Ser then P ∈Ser,
by induction in the inference; hence Ser is the set of processes that are congruent to
programs.
We now turn to the statement of the fact: if P ∈Ser and P→∗ Q then Q∈Ser. We
proceed by induction in the length of the derivation. In the induction step, P→∗ R→Q
with R∈Ser, we consider the place where the basic axiom is used for establishing
R→Q. Since a process of the form T cannot contain any labels or binders the basic
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axiom used for R→Q cannot involve any subprocess of the form T . It follows that
the basic axiom must take place inside the (necessarily unique) occurrence of nl?? [· · ·]
in R. Inspection of the "ve basic axioms then immediately establish the result.
It should be clear that the syntactic annotations in no way in#uence the semantics.
We can make this precise as follows. Let • be a distinguished stable name, let c• and
n• be distinguished binders, and let l
a
•, l
i
•, l
o
•, l
p
• , lc• and l
n
• be distinguished labels.
Given a process P write P for the process where all stable names, binders and labels
are replaced by the appropriate distinguished stable names, binders and labels.
Fact 2. The semantics is invariant under annotations:
If P→∗ Q and P= P′ then there exists Q′ such that P′→∗ Q′ and Q=
Q′.
Proof. We "rst consider the similar statement for the congruence:
If P≡Q and P= P′ then there exists Q′ such that P′≡Q′ and Q= Q′;
similarly if P≡Q and Q= Q′ then there exists P′ such that P′≡Q′ and
P= P′.
It is proved by induction in the inference tree for P≡Q.
We then prove the statement of the fact by induction in the length of the derivation
P→∗ Q. For the induction step P→∗ R→Q we proceed by induction in the shape of
the inference tree for R→Q.
3. Control %ow analysis
Immediate constituents of ambients. The main aim of the control #ow analysis is
to obtain the following information for each ambient: (i) which ambients may be
immediately contained in it, (ii) which capabilities may it perform, (iii) which input
actions may be performed immediately inside it, and (iv) which output actions may be
performed immediately inside it. An ambient will be identi"ed by its label la ∈Laba,
an in-capability by its label li ∈Labi, an out-capability by its label lo ∈Labo, an open-
capability by its label lp ∈Labp, an input of a capability by its binder 3 c ∈Bndc,
an input of a name by its binder n ∈Bndn, the output of a capability by its label
lc ∈Labc, and the output of a name by its label ln ∈Labn.
The analysis records this information in the following component:
I ∈ InAmb = Laba → P
(
Laba ∪ Labi ∪ Labo ∪ Labp∪
Labc ∪ Labn ∪ Bndc ∪ Bndn
)
3 This actually confuses binders with labels; it would be notationally purer, but somewhat heavier, to
demand input actions to be annotated not only with a binder but also with a label.
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When specifying the analysis we shall also use the “inverse” mapping
I−1 : (Lab ∪ Bnd)→ P(Laba)
that returns the set of ambients in which the given ambient, capability, input or output
might occur; formally z ∈ I(la) if and only if la ∈ I−1(z). Later we shall write z ∈ I+(l)
to mean that there exists l1; : : : ; ln (for n ¿ 1) such that l= l1, z= ln, and ∀i ¡
n: li+1 ∈ I(li).
Stable names of ambients and capabilities. Ambients and capabilities have stable
names associated with them and to keep track of this information the analysis also
contains the following component:
H ∈ HNam = (Laba ∪ Labi ∪ Labo ∪ Labp)→ P(SNam):
As above we shall also use the “inverse mapping”
H−1 : SNam → P(Laba ∪ Labi ∪ Labo ∪ Labp)
that returns the set of ambients that might have the given stable name; formally
∈H (l) if and only if l∈H−1(). The information in H is needed to determine
the ambients operated upon by the capabilities so as to accurately update the contents
of I .
Naming environment. The association between free names and variables, and their
stable names and binders, is expressed by a naming environment:
me ∈MEnv= (Nam ∪ Varc ∪ Varn)→"n (SNam ∪ Bndc ∪ Bndn)
such that me(n) ∈ SNam; me(x) ∈ Bndc; me(u) ∈ Bndn
Here we impose the condition that the marker environment “preserves the types” of
names, variables ranging over capabilities and variables ranging over names.
We shall write me? for the initial naming environment for the program n
l?
? [P?] of
interest and dom(me?) for its "nite domain. Recall that for n
l?
? [P?] to be a program
we demand that P? is closed, that n? =∈ fn(P?) and that P? does not contain l?. For
(me?; n
l?
? [P?]) to constitute a program of interest we then demand that:
nl?? [P?] is a program,
me? de"nes all the free names of n
l?
? [P?], i.e. fn(n
l?
? [P?]) ⊆ dom(me?), and me?
does not de"ne any variables, i.e. dom(me?) ⊆ Nam, and
the stable name ? is distinguished, does not occur in P?, and is only possessed
by n?, i.e. me
−1
? (?)= {n?}.
(Here we write me−1? () for the set {n | me?(n)= } of names mapped to .)
Communication and stable capabilities. The environment R is responsible for collecting
the values that can be bound to the variables as result of an input action. The variables
are represented by their binders. In the case of input of names it is natural to represent
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the name by its stable name. In a similar way, in the case of input of capabilities, we
shall represent the capability by its stable capability:
m˜ ∈ SCap;
m˜ ::= inl
i | outlo | openlp
There are no stable capabilities corresponding to null capabilities () and paths (M1:M2);
instead the analysis will break 4 them into the set of constituent in-, out-, and open-
capabilities.
The communication box C is responsible for collecting the eEects of the output
actions taking place immediately inside the ambient: again the ambient is identi"ed
by its label and the value being communicated will be a stable capability or a stable
name:
R = (Rc; Rn) ∈ Env = (Bndc → P(SCap))× (Bndn → P(SNam));
C = (Cc; Cn) ∈ Comm = (Laba → P(SCap))× (Laba → P(SNam)):
Also the information in R and C will be needed to accurately update the contents of
I in the presence of communication.
Example 3. Consider the program nl?? [Firewall |Agent] of Example 1 and the follow-
ing analysis estimate (where the initial naming environment me? maps the names n?,
k, k′ and k′′ to ?, k, k ′ and k ′′, respectively):
I(l?) = {A;B;C};
I(A) = {1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6;A;B;C;D};
I(B) = {1; 2; 3};
I(C) = {1; 2; 3; 6;A;B;C;D};
I(D) = ∅;
label l? A B C D 1 2 3 4 5 6
H {?} {w} {k} {k ′} {k ′′} {w} {k ′} {w} {k ′} {k ′′} {k}
This shows that the ambient labelled A might perform transitions consuming any of the
capabilities labelled 1–6 and that it might contain any of the ambients labelled A–D;
in particular it might contain the ambient labelled C indicating that the agent might
enter the "rewall—and as shown in Example 2 this indeed happens.
No communication is taking place and it is therefore safe to set Rc(c)= ∅ and
Rn(n)= ∅ for all binders and to set Cc(la)= ∅ and Cn(la)= ∅ for all labels.
4 Clearly a more precise analysis can be devised; however, we choose the simpler approach so that the
constraint solver of Section 3.3 only needs to operate in a "nite universe and hence can compute solutions
explicitly in cubic time.
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Table 4
Control #ow analysis (for processes)
(I; H; C; R) |=lme (n)P iE (I; H; C; R) |=lme[n →] P
(I; H; C; R) |=lme 0 iE true
(I; H; C; R) |=lme P |P′ iE (I; H; C; R) |=lme P∧
(I; H; C; R) |=lme P′
(I; H; C; R) |=lme !P iE (I; H; C; R) |=lme P
(I; H; C; R) |=lme N l
a
[P] iE (I; H; C; R) |=lame P ∧ la ∈ I(l)∧
(I; H; C; R) ‖≡me N : N˜ ∧ N˜ ⊆ H (la)
(I; H; C; R) |=lme M: P iE (I; H; C; R) |=lme P∧
(I; H; C; R) |¿me M : M˜∧
∀m˜∈ M˜ : (I; H; C; R) |≡l m˜
(I; H; C; R) |=lme 〈M〉l
c
iE lc ∈ I(l) ∧ (I; H; C; R) |¿me M : M˜∧
∀la ∈ I−1(lc) :Cc(la) ⊇ M˜
(I; H; C; R) |=lme 〈〈N 〉〉l
n
iE ln ∈ I(l) ∧ (I; H; C; R) ‖≡me N : N˜∧
∀la ∈ I−1(ln) : Cn(la) ⊇ N˜
(I; H; C; R) |=lme (x
c
): P iE (I; H; C; R) |=lme[x →c] P ∧ c ∈ I(l)∧
∀la ∈ I−1(c) : Cc(la) ⊆ Rc(c)
(I; H; C; R) |=lme ((u
n
)): P iE (I; H; C; R) |=lme[u →n] P ∧ n ∈ I(l)∧
∀la ∈ I−1(n) : Cn(la) ⊆ Rn(n)
3.1. The acceptability relation
The acceptability of a control #ow estimate is de"ned by the following four predi-
cates (de"ned in Tables 4 and 5 and explained below):
(I; H; C; R) |=lme P for checking a process P ∈Proc;
(I; H; C; R) |¿me M : M˜ for translating a capability M ∈Cap into a
set M˜ ∈P(SCap) of stable capabilities;
(I; H; C; R) ‖≡me N : N˜ for decoding a naming N ∈Nam into a set
N˜ ∈P(SNam) of stable names;
(I; H; C; R) |≡l m˜ for checking a stable capability m˜∈SCap.
Analysis of processes. Table 4 gives a simple syntax-directed de"nition of what it
means for an analysis estimate (I; H; C; R) to be acceptable for the process P. The
predicate is de"ned relative to the current naming environment me and the current
label l of the enclosing ambient. The naming environment is updated whenever we
pass through a restriction operator or an input and the label is updated whenever we
pass inside a new ambient. Note that the analysis cannot distinguish between whether
a process occurs only once or many times: !P and P are analysed in the same way
(as are P |P and P).
The clause for ambients Nl
a
[P] "rst checks the subprocess P using the appropriate
naming environment and label. It then demands that the label of the ambient is recorded
as being inside the current label. Finally, it demands that the stable name of the ambient
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Table 5
Control #ow analysis (for capabilities and namings)
(I; H; C; R) |¿me inli N : M˜ iE (I; H; C; R) ‖≡me N : N˜∧
M˜ ⊇ {inli} ∧ H (li) ⊇ N˜
(I; H; C; R) |¿me outloN : M˜ iE (I; H; C; R) ‖≡me N : N˜∧
M˜ ⊇ {outlo} ∧ H (lo) ⊇ N˜
(I; H; C; R) |¿me openlpN : M˜ iE (I; H; C; R) ‖≡me N : N˜∧
M˜ ⊇ {openlp} ∧ H (lp) ⊇ N˜
(I; H; C; R) |¿me x : M˜ iE M˜ ⊇ Rc(me(x))
(I; H; C; R) |¿me  : M˜ iE M˜ ⊇ ∅
(I; H; C; R) |¿me M1:M2 : M˜ iE (I; H; C; R) |¿me M1 : M˜ 1∧
(I; H; C; R) |¿me M2 : M˜ 2∧
M˜ ⊇ M˜ 1 ∪ M˜ 2
(I; H; C; R) ‖≡me n : N˜ iE N˜ ⊇ {me(n)}
(I; H; C; R) ‖≡me u : N˜ iE N˜ ⊇ Rn(me(u))
(I; H; C; R) |≡l inli iE li ∈ I(l)∧
∀la ∈ I−1(li) : ∀∈H (li) : ∀la′ ∈ I−1(la) :
∀la′′ ∈ I(la′ ) ∩ H−1() ∩ Laba :
la ∈ I(la′′ )
(I; H; C; R) |≡l outlo iE lo ∈ I(l)∧
∀la ∈ I−1(lo) : ∀∈H (lo) :
∀la′ ∈ I−1(la) ∩ H−1() :
∀la′′ ∈ I−1(la′ ) : la ∈ I(la′′ )
(I; H; C; R) |≡l openlp iE lp ∈ I(l)∧
∀la ∈ I−1(lp) : ∀∈H (lp) :
∀la′ ∈ I(la) ∩ H−1() ∩ Laba :
∀l′ ∈ I(la′ ) : l′ ∈ I(la)
is recorded as being a name of the ambient. Intuitively, N˜ is the singleton {me(n)}
when N is n; this is made precise by Table 5 explained below.
As in Prolog, all free identi"ers (like N˜ and M˜) on the right-hand sides of clauses
are implicitly assumed to be existentially quanti"ed; this means that whenever a clause
is applied we are free to supply suitable values for these identi"ers.
The clause for movement M:P "rst checks the subprocess P using the appropriate
naming environment and label. It then translates the capability M into the set of stable
capabilities M˜ . Intuitively M˜ is the singleton {inli} when M is inli n and similarly for
the other capabilities; this is made precise by Table 5 explained below (that also takes
care of associating the stable name of n with the label li).
The two clauses for output actions "rst record that the action may take place inside
the enclosing ambient. The next step is to translate the capability M (resp. the name
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N ) into a set of stable capabilities M˜ (resp. a set of stable names N˜ ) thereby making
it independent of the context. The communication box C is then updated to record that
each ambient la (including l) that could contain the output action will in fact witness
the output of M˜ (resp. N˜ ).
Finally, the two clauses for input action "rst update the environment me to record
the binding of the variable before analysing the subprocess. It is then ensured that the
component I contains the appropriate binder (c or n) representing the input action.
To determine the possible value being communicated (and hence bound to the variable
represented by the binder) we have to consult the communication box of the enclosing
ambient. So for all ambients la (including l) that might contain the input action we
record that the contents of the communication box C(la) can be a value of the binder
and we use the environment R to capture this.
Translation of capabilities and namings. The "rst two parts of Table 5 translate ca-
pabilities and namings into a form where they are independent of the context. For
capabilities we return (in M˜) the stable capability and in the H component the stable
names relating to the capability. It would have been very natural to follow [18] in
bypassing the H component for this purpose and to include the stable name in the
stable capability; the reason for not doing so is to allow approximations that will yield
faster analyses than possible using the approach of [18].
The entities recorded in R come into play in the clause for translating variables to
stable capabilities and stable namings; as an example, for a capability variable x we
consult me and Rc to determine the possible stable capabilities that x might stand for.
The two clauses for null capabilities and paths show how capabilites are broken up
into their atomic constituents; as mentioned earlier this is to facilitate the development
of a simple constraint solver for implementing the analysis in polynomial time.
The form of the judgements for translating capabilities and namings combine the
verbose and succinct forms of #ow logic [16]. The verbose format, as used for the
analysis of processes and capabilities, explicitly contains a record of the information
as it pertains to all internal program points; this is part of the (I; H; C; R) component.
The succinct format, to be speci"c the M˜ and N˜ components of the judgements for
translation, directly expresses auxiliary information that is only of local interest. The
use of succinct components frequently make speci"cations more readable and tend to
give them the #avour of type systems. The relationship between verbose and succinct
speci"cations is studied in [21].
Analysis of capabilities. The last part of Table 5 shows how to check stable capabilities
against the control #ow estimate (I; H; C; R). Fig. 2 illustrates these clauses pictorially;
the similarity between Figs. 2 and 1 stresses the systematic way in which a control
#ow analysis may be developed from a formal semantics and we regard this as a strong
point of our approach.
The clause for inl
i
"rst ensures that the stable capability is properly recorded as part
of the current ambient l. Then it ensures that all contexts la in which the capabil-
ity could occur (and this clearly includes l) are properly recorded as being possible
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Fig. 2. Pictorial representation of the analysis of atomic capabilities.
subambients of all sibling ambients la
′′
having a stable name  associated with inl
i
.
This involves quantifying over all possible parent ambients la
′
and using the component
H to obtain the stable name of the ambient that la
′′
indicates.
The clause for outl
o
follows a similar pattern. First it ensures that the stable capability
is recorded as part of the current ambient l. Next, it ensures that all contexts la in
which the capability could occur (and again this includes l) are properly recorded as
being possible ambients in all the possible grandparents la
′′
provided that the parent la
′
has a stable name  associated with outl
o
.
For the stable capability openl
p
we once again start by ensuring that it is properly
recorded as part of the current ambient l. Then we consider all contexts la in which the
capability could occur (and again this includes l) and "nd all subambients la
′
having
a stable name  associated with openl
p
; these are opened by ensuring that whatever is
included in the subambient la
′
also occurs in the parent ambient la.
It is crucial to observe that we need to consult all possible contexts la in which the
capability could occur and not just the obvious candidate l. This is because, in order
to establish semantic soundness, the analysis has to take into account that the current
ambient might be dissolved by an open-capability.
Example 4. Let us check the condition
(I; H; C; R) |=Ame kB[out1w:in2k′:in3w]
that arises when checking that the analysis estimate (I; H; C; R) of Example 3 correctly
validates the program nl?? [Firewall |Agent] of Example 1; here the naming environment
me maps n?, k, k′, k′′ and w to ?, k, k ′, k ′′ and w, respectively. First we decide to
let N˜ be {k}. We then need to check that (I; H; C; R) ‖≡me k : {k} (which follows from
the choice of me), that {k}⊆H (B) (which follows from Example 3), that B∈ I(A)
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(which once more follows from Example 3) and that (I; H; C; R) |=Bme out1w: in2k′: in3w
(see below).
To check that (I; H; C; R) |=Bme out1w: in2k′: in3w we "rst decide to let M˜ be {out1}.
We then need to check that (I; H; C; R) |¿me out1w : {out1} (which follows from
(I; H; C; R) ‖≡me w : {w} and H (1)⊇{w}), that (I; H; C; R) |≡B out1 (see below) and that
(I; H; C; R) |=Bme in2k
′
: in3w (which amounts to twice repeating the checking procedure
being illustrated for out1w).
Finally, let us check that (I; H; C; R) |≡B out1. First we check that 1∈ I(B) (using
Example 3). For the second condition we have la ∈ I−1(1)= {A;B;C} and ∈H (1)=
{w}; for each of the choices for la we have la′ ∈ I−1(la)∩H−1(w)= {l?;A;C}∩ {A;
1; 3}= {A} so the parent ambient la′ of la will always be A. The grandparent of
la is la
′′ ∈ I−1(A)= {l?;A;C} so the second condition amounts to checking that all
of A; B and C are elements of all of I(l?), I(A) and I(C) and clearly this is the
case.
3.2. Properties of the analysis
In the terminology of data #ow analysis [17] the above analysis is 3ow-insensitive
since we ignore the order in which the capabilities occur; also it is context-insensitive
(or monovariant) since a capability is analysed in the same way for all contexts
in which it occurs. We refer to [14, 19, 22] for more precise ways of analysing the
communication-free fragment.
Semantic correctness. Having speci"ed what it means for an analysis estimate (I; H;
C; R) to be acceptable the next step is to show that the notion of acceptability is
semantically meaningful. We begin by establishing some auxiliary properties.
Fact 3. The analysis enjoys the following monotonicity properties:
(i) If (I; H; C; R) |=l1me P and I(l1)⊆ I(l2) then (I; H; C; R) |=l2me P.
(ii) If (I; H; C; R) |¿me M : M˜1 and M˜1⊆ M˜2 then (I; H; C; R) |¿me M : M˜2.
(iii) If (I; H; C; R) ‖≡me N : N˜1 and N˜1⊆ N˜2 then (I; H; C; R) ‖≡me N : N˜2.
(iv) If (I; H; C; R) |≡l1 m˜ and I(l1)⊆ I(l2) then (I; H; C; R) |≡l2 m˜.
Proof. It is immediate to prove (iii) by inspection of the two cases for N .
We then prove (ii) by inspection of the six cases for M and all but one case is
immediate. In the case for M1:M2 we have (I; H; C; R) |¿me M1 : M˜ ′1 and (I; H; C; R) |¿me
M2 : M˜ ′2 for some M˜
′
1 and M˜
′
2 such that M˜1⊇ M˜ ′1 ∪ M˜ ′2; it is then immediate that
M˜2⊇ M˜ ′1 ∪ M˜ ′2 as was to be shown.
Next we prove (iv) by inspection of the three cases for m˜. All cases are immediate
since the label li (for i=1; 2) is only used to establish a fact of the form l′ ∈ I(li).
Finally we prove (i) by structural induction in P. This is straightforward because
the label li (for i=1; 2) is only used in recursive calls, to establish a fact of the form
l′ ∈ I(li) or ′ ∈ I(li), or to invoke (iv).
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To express the next fact we shall write me1 =P me2 to mean that me1 and me2 are
equal on the free names and variables of P; in a similar way we write me1 =M me2
and me1 =N me2 for capabilities M and namings N .
Fact 4. The analysis only depends on the free names and variables:
(i) If me1 =P me2 and (I; H; C; R) |=lme1 P then (I; H; C; R) |=lme2 P.
(ii) If me1 =M me2 and (I; H; C; R) |¿me1 M : M˜ then (I; H; C; R) |¿me2 M : M˜ .
(iii) If me1 =N me2 and (I; H; C; R) ‖≡me1 N : N˜ then (I; H; C; R) ‖≡me2 N : N˜ .
Proof. The proof of (iii) is immediate by inspection of the two cases for N . Next the
proof of (ii) is straightforward by structural induction in M and using (iii). Finally the
proof (i) is by a straightforward structural induction using (ii) and (iii); in particular,
the induction hypothesis still applies in the cases of restriction, input of capabilities
and input of names, where the naming environment is updated.
Lemma 1. The analysis is invariant under the congruence:
If P≡Q then (I; H; C; R) |=lme P if and only if (I; H; C; R) |=lme Q.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the proof of P≡Q and relies on Fact 4. Most
cases are straightforward and we just illustrate one of the more interesting ones.
Consider the case (n)(P |Q)≡P | (n)Q where n =∈ fn(P). It is immediate from
the clauses of Table 4 that
(I; H; C; R) |=lme (n)(P |Q)
is equivalent to (I; H; C; R) |=lme[n→] P |Q and hence to
(I; H; C; R) |=lme[n→] P ∧ (I; H; C; R) |=lme[n→] Q
Since n =∈ fn(P) it follows from Fact 4 that this is equivalent to
(I; H; C; R) |=lme P ∧ (I; H; C; R) |=lme[n→] Q
and using the clauses of Table 4 this is equivalent to
(I; H; C; R) |=lme P | (n)Q
as desired.
In order to establish the subject reduction result we shall additionally need the fol-
lowing central result showing how substitutions work:
Lemma 2. The analysis enjoys the following substitution properties:
(i) If (I; H; C; R) |¿me M :Rc(c) and (I; H; C; R) |=lme[x →c] P then (I; H; C; R) |=lme
P[x←M ].
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(ii) If (I; H; C; R) ‖≡me N :Rn(n) and (I; H; C; R) |=lme[u →n] P then (I; H; C; R) |=lme
P[u←N ].
Proof. As a preparation for proving (ii) we "rst prove
if (I; H; C; R) ‖≡me N :Rn(n) and (I; H; C; R) ‖≡me[u →n] N ′ : N˜ ′
then (I; H; C; R) ‖≡me N ′[u← N ] : N˜ ′
by inspection of the two cases for N ′. Next we prove
if (I; H; C; R) ‖≡me N :Rn(n) and (I; H; C; R) |¿me[u →n]M : M˜
then (I; H; C; R) |¿me M [u← N ] : M˜
by structural induction in M and using the result just established; the proof is straight-
forward. We are then ready to prove (ii) by structural induction in P and using the
two results just established; also this proof is straightforward.
As a preparation for proving (i) we "rst prove
if (I; H; C; R) |¿me M :Rc(c) and (I; H; C; R) |¿me[x →c]M ′ : M˜ ′ then
(I; H; C; R) |¿meM ′[x ← M ] : M˜ ′
by structural induction in M ′; the proof is straightforward. We are then ready to prove
(i) by structural induction in P and using the result just established; also this proof is
straightforward.
Theorem 1. Subject reduction:
If (I; H; C; R) |=lme P and P→∗ Q then (I; H; C; R) |=lme Q.
Proof. The proof is by induction in the length of the derivation. In the induction step,
P→∗ S→Q, we have (I; H; C; R) |=lme S from the induction hypothesis and need to
show (I; H; C; R) |=lme Q.
We proceed by induction in the transition S→Q. We "rst consider the reduction
rules in the left-hand side of Table 3. The proofs for the "rst three are straightfor-
ward using the induction hypothesis and the speci"cation of Table 4; the proof for the
fourth reduction rule, the one involving the congruence, is a direct consequence of the
induction hypothesis and Lemma 1. We next turn our attention to the basic axioms in
the right-hand side of Table 3. The proof for the in- and out-capabilities are straight-
forward using the speci"cations of Tables 4 and 5. In the case of the open-capability
we additionally make use of Fact 3. Finally, in the case of communication we make
use of Lemma 2. This concludes the proof.
As a consequence, if (I; H; C; R) is an acceptable analysis estimate for the program
(me?; n
l?
? [P?]) of interest then it will continue being so for all the derivatives of the
program.
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Existence of analysis estimates. So far we have only shown how to check that a given
estimate (I; H; C; R) is indeed an acceptable analysis estimate; we have not studied (i)
whether or not acceptable analysis estimates always exist, and if they do, (ii) whether
or not there always is a least analysis estimate.
To obtain these results we shall show that the set of acceptable analysis estimates
constitutes a Moore family (sometimes called a model intersection property):
A subset Y of a complete lattice (L;) is a Moore family whenever Y ′⊆Y implies
that Y ′ ∈Y .
By taking Y ′= ∅ we see that a Moore family Y cannot be empty and by taking Y ′=Y
we see that it always contains a least element; this will be essential for answering (i)
and (ii) in the aFrmative.
In our setting the complete lattice of interest is the set
InAmb×HNam × Comm × Env
of tuples of mappings (I; H; C; R) and the ordering is the pointwise extension of the
subset ordering. It follows that greatest lower bounds are calculated in a pointwise
manner:
j∈J (Ij; Hj; Cj; Rj) = (j∈J Ij;j∈JHj;j∈JCj;j∈J Rj):
Since I  I ′ holds if and only if I−1 I ′−1 we also have (j∈J Ij)−1 = j∈J (I−1j ).
Finally, recall that j∈J · · · produces the greatest element  when J is the empty set.
We can now prove that the set of acceptable control #ow estimates constitute a
Moore family and hence that there always is a least estimate:
Theorem 2. The set {(I; H; C; R) | (I; H; C; R) |=lme P} is a Moore family for all l; me
and P.
Proof. The proof is in four parts. The "rst parts amounts to proving that
{(I; H; C; R; N˜ ) | (I; H; C; R)‖≡me N : N˜}
is a Moore family for all me and N . This is immediate by inspection of the two cases
for N .
The second part establishes that
{(I; H; C; R) | (I; H; C; R)|≡l m˜}
is a Moore family for all l and m˜. We proceed by inspection of the three cases for m˜.
In the case of in-capabilities we assume that
∀j ∈ J : (Ij; Hj; Cj; Rj)|≡l inli (1)
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and note that then li ∈ Ij(l) for all j∈ J and hence li ∈ (j∈J Ij)(l). Next consider
la, , la
′
and la
′′
such that la ∈ (j∈J Ij)−1(li), ∈ (j∈J Hj)(li), la′ ∈ (j∈J Ij)−1(la),
la
′′ ∈ (j∈J Ij)(la′)∩ (j∈J Hj)−1()∩Laba. It is immediate that we then have la ∈ I−1j
(li), ∈Hj(li), la′ ∈ I−1j (la), la
′′ ∈ Ij(la′)∩H−1j ()∩Laba for all j∈ J ; it then follows
from (1) that la ∈ Ij(la′′) for all j∈ J and hence that la ∈ (j∈J Ij)(la′′). In conclusion
we then have
(j∈J (Ij; Hj; Cj; Rj))|≡l inli
as desired. The cases of out- and open-capabilities are similar.
The third part shows that
{(I; H; C; R; M˜) | (I; H; C; R; )|¿meM : M˜}
is a Moore family for all M and me. The proof is by structural induction in M and
let us consider the case M1:M2. Here we assume that
∀j ∈ J : (Ij; Hj; Cj; Rj)|¿meM1:M2 : M˜ j
Hence there exist families (M˜j1)j∈J and (M˜j2)j∈J such that
∀j ∈ J : (Ij; Hj; Cj; Rj)|¿meM1 : M˜j1
∀j ∈ J : (Ij; Hj; Cj; Rj)|¿meM2 : M˜j2
∀j ∈ J : M˜ j ⊇ M˜ j1 ∪ M˜ j2
By the induction hypothesis it follows that
(j∈J (Ij; Hj; Cj; Rj))|¿meM1 ∩j∈J M˜j1
(j∈J (Ij; Hj; Cj; Rj))|¿meM2 ∩j∈J M˜j2
(∩j∈J M˜ j) ⊇ (∩j∈J M˜ j1) ∪ (∩j∈J M˜ j2)
so that
(j∈J (Ij; Hj; Cj; Rj))|¿meM1:M2 : ∩j∈J M˜j
as desired. The remaining cases are similar.
Finally, the fourth part of the proof establishes the statement of the theorem. It is
proved by structural induction in P and involves no new methods of reasoning beyond
those already illustrated; we therefore only illustrate the case Nl
a
[P] of ambients. Here
we assume that
∀j ∈ J : (Ij; Hj; Cj; Rj) |=lme N l
a
[P]
It follows that there exists a family (N˜j)j∈J such that
∀j ∈ J : (Ij; Hj; Cj; Rj) |=lame P
∀j ∈ J : la ∈ Ij(l)
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∀j ∈ J : (Ij; Hj; Cj; Rj)‖≡meN : N˜ j
∀j ∈ J : N˜ j ⊆ Hj(la)
Using the induction hypothesis and the results established above we then have
(j∈J (Ij; Hj; Cj; Rj)) |=me laP
la ∈ (j∈J Ij)(l)
(j∈J (Ij; Hj; Cj; Rj))‖≡meN : ∩j∈J N˜ j
∩j∈J N˜ j ⊆ (j∈J Hj)(la)
and the desired
(

j∈J
(Ij; Hj; Cj; Rj)
)
|=lme N l
a
[P]
then follows. This concludes the proof.
3.3. Algorithmic properties
We now show how to compute in cubic time the least solutions guaranteed by
Theorem 2. We shall proceed in three stages. In the "rst we generate a set of master
constraints. In the second we expand the master constraints to a larger set of conditional
constraints. Finally, we solve the conditional constraints in cubic time. As mentioned
earlier we may without loss of generality assume that Lab∪Bnd∪SNam is "nite.
Master constraints. To generate the master constraints we use four functions. The
auxiliary functions VM and VN of Table 7 extract the “succinct results” produced by
the analysis of capabilities and namings; these are the analogues of the sets M˜ and N˜
and here take the forms { Rm1; : : : ; Rmk} and { Rn}, where
Rm ::= {{inli}} | { outlo}} | { openlp}}|Rc(c)
Rn ::= {{}} | Rn(n)
and c ∈Bndc, ∈SNam and n ∈Bndn. To make it clear that we are now talking
about syntax we write {{· · ·} instead of {· · ·} and Rn instead of Rn etc. Intuitively,
the minimal M˜ such that (I; H; C; R) |¿me M : M˜ is given by
⋃{ Rm | Rm∈VM<M =me} and
the minimal N˜ such that (I; H; C; R) ‖≡me N : N˜ is given by
⋃{ Rn | Rn∈VN<N =me}; we
shall be slightly more precise in Lemma 3 below. (There is no need for an analogous
function VP for processes since they do not have a “succinct” component.)
The constraint generation functions CP and CM of Tables 6 and 7 generate mas-
ter constraints for processes and capabilities, respectively. Master constraints take the
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Table 6
Constraint generation (for processes)
CP<(n)P=lme = CP<P=lme[n →]
CP<0=lme = ∅
CP<P |P′=lme = CP<P=lme ∪ CP<P′=lme
CP<!P=lme = CP<P=lme
CP<Nl
a
[P]=lme = CP<P=l
a
me ∪ {{{la}} ⊆ I(l)}∪
{ Rn ⊆ H(la) | Rn ∈ VN<N =me}
CP<M: P=lme = CP<P=lme ∪ CM<M =me∪
⋃
Rm∈VM<M =me


if Rm is {{inli}} then { |≡• inli ; {{li}} ⊆ I(l)} else
if Rm is {{outlo}} then { |≡• outlo ; {{lo}} ⊆ I(l)} else
if Rm is {{openlp}} then { |≡• openlp ; {{lp}} ⊆ I(l)} else

∀li ∈ Labi : {{inli}} ⊆ Rm⇒ |≡• inli ;
∀li ∈ Labi : {{inli}} ⊆ Rm⇒{ li}} ⊆ I(l);
∀lo ∈ Labo : {{outlo}} ⊆ Rm⇒ |≡• outlo ;
∀lo ∈ Labo : {{outlo}} ⊆ Rm⇒{ lo}} ⊆ I(l);
∀lp ∈ Labp : {{openlp}} ⊆ Rm⇒ |≡• openlp ;
∀lp ∈ Labp : {{openlp}} ⊆ Rm⇒{ lp}} ⊆ I(l)




CP<〈M〉lc =lme = {{{lc}} ⊆ I(l)} ∪ CM<M =me∪
{∀la ∈ I−1(lc) : Rm ⊆ Cc(la) | Rm ∈ VM<M =me}
CP<〈〈N 〉〉ln =lme = {{{ln}} ⊆ I(l)}∪
{∀la ∈ I−1(ln) : Rn ⊆ Cn(la) | Rn ∈ VN<N =me}
CP<(x
c
): P=lme = CP<P=lme[x →c] ∪ {{{c}} ⊆ I(l)}∪
{∀la ∈ I−1(c) : Cc(la) ⊆ Rc(c)}
CP<((u
n
)): P=lme = CP<P=lme[u →n] ∪ {{{n}} ⊆ I(l)}∪
{∀la ∈ I−1(n) : Cn(la) ⊆ Rn(n)}
following rather permissive forms:
{{l}} ⊆ I(la)
{{}} ⊆ I(la)
Rn ⊆ H(l)
|≡•inl and similarly for outl and openl
∀l ∈ Labi : {{inl}} ⊆ Rc(c)⇒ {{l}} ⊆ I(la) and similarly for outl and openl
∀l ∈ Labi : {{inl}} ⊆ Rc(c)⇒ |≡•inl and similarly for outl and openl
∀l ∈ I−1(lc) : Rm ⊆ Cc(l) and similarly for ln; Rn and Cn
∀l ∈ I−1(c) : Cc(l) ⊆ Rc(c) and similarly for n; Cn and Rn
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Table 7
Constraint generation (for capabilities and namings)
CM<inl
i
N =me = { Rn ⊆ H(li) | Rn ∈ VN<N =me}
CM<outl
o
N =me = { Rn ⊆ H(lo) | Rn ∈ VN<N =me}
CM<openl
p
N =me = { Rn ⊆ H(lp) | Rn ∈ VN<N =me}
CM<x=me = ∅
CM<=me = ∅
CM<M1:M2=me = CM<M1=me ∪ CM<M2=me
VM<inl
i
N =me = {{{inli}}}
VM<outl
o
N =me = {{{outlo}}}
VM<openl
p
N =me = {{{openlp}}}
VM<x=me = {Rc(me(x))}
VM<=me = ∅
VM<M1:M2=me = VM<M1=me ∪ VM<M2=me
VN<n=me = {{{me(n)}}}
VN<u=me = {Rn(me(u))}
The constraint |≡• inli intuitively stands for |≡l inli of Table 5 but without the condition
li ∈ I(l), i.e.
∀la ∈ I−1(li) : ∀ ∈ H (li) : ∀la′ ∈ I−1(la) :
∀la′′ ∈ I(la′) ∩ H−1() ∩ Laba :
la ∈ I(la′′)
and similarly for |≡• outlo and |≡• openlp . (There is no need for a constraint generation
function CN for namings.)
We shall dispense with formally de"ning what it means for a control #ow estimate
(I; H; C; R) to satisfy a set of master constraints since the idea is clear: each constraint
must be ful"lled when interpreting the formula with {· · ·} for {{· · ·} and Rn(· · ·)
for Rn(· · ·) etc. We shall write (I; H; C; R) |=C when (I; H; C; R) satis"es a set C of
constraints and < Rm=(I;H;C;R) for the value of Rm under the interpretation (I; H; C; R) and
similarly for < Rn=(I;H;C;R). It is then straightforward to prove that the master constraints
generated by Tables 6 and 7 faithfully model the acceptability relation of Tables 4
and 5.
Lemma 3. (I; H; C; R) |=lme P if and only if (I; H; C; R) |=CP<P=lme.
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Proof. The proof is by structural induction establishing also the following results:
(I; H; C; R)‖≡meN : N˜ iE ∀ Rn ∈ VN<N =me : < Rn=(I;H;C;R) ⊆ N˜
(I; H; C; R)|¿meM : M˜ iE
∀ Rm ∈ VM<M =me : < Rm=(I;H;C;R) ⊆ M˜∧
(I; H; C; R) |= CM<M =me
We dispense with the details.
Example 5. The set CP<Firewall |Agent=l?me? of master contraints for the program nl??
[Firewall |Agent] of Example 1 consists of the following master constraints (assuming
that me? is as in Example 3 and ignoring the subprocesses P and Q):
{{A}} ⊆ I(l?) {{w}} ⊆ H(A)
{{B}} ⊆ I(A) {{k}} ⊆ H(B)
{{1}} ⊆ I(B) |≡•out1 {{w}} ⊆ H(1)
{{2}} ⊆ I(B) |≡•in2 {{k ′}} ⊆ H(2)
{{3}} ⊆ I(B) |≡•in3 {{w}} ⊆ H(3)
{{4}} ⊆ I(A) |≡•open4 {{k ′}} ⊆ H(4)
{{5}} ⊆ I(A) |≡•open5 {{k ′′}} ⊆ H(5)
{{C}} ⊆ I(l?) {{k ′}} ⊆ H(C)
{{6}} ⊆ I(C) |≡•open6 {{k}} ⊆ H(6)
{{D}} ⊆ I(C) {{k ′′}} ⊆ H(D)
It is straightforward to check that the analysis estimate (I; H; C; R) of Example 3 indeed
satis"es these master constraints.
Suppose that the program is of size p¿ 1 and that the size of the "nite set Lab∪Bnd
∪SNam is q ¿ 1. It is natural to assume that q=O(p) as when Lab∪Bnd∪SNam
is a "nite set consisting only of the entities used in the program; however, we shall
allow to let q be less than p so as to trade precision for eFciency.
Note that VN<N =me is always a singleton and that CM<M =me and VM<M =me contain
no more elements than corresponds to the size of M . It is then immediate that constraint
generation operates in time O(p) and that it produces O(p) master constraints each of
size O(1). Since q may be much smaller than p it will be useful to observe that the
number of constraints can also be given as O(q2); to see this simply note that each
master constraint contains at most two “free” symbols from Lab∪Bnd∪SNam. In this
case constraint generation time should be estimated as O(p+ q2).
Conditional constraints. The next stage is to expand the master constraints into sets of
conditional constraints that do not involve quanti"ers and that do not rely on the |≡• · · ·
abbreviations adapted from Table 5. The general syntax of conditional constraints is
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based on constants (denoted set), variables (denoted var), conditions (denoted cond)
and constraints (denoted constr):
set ::= {{l}} | { }} | { }} | { inl}} | { outl}} | { openl}}
var ::= I(l) | H(l) | Cc(l) | Cn(l) | Rc() | Rn()| · · ·
cond ::= set ⊆ var
constr ::= cond | cond⇒ constr
To transform master constraints into conditional constraints we perform the following
operations:
• expand var1⊆ var2 into ∀set : set⊆ var1⇒ set⊆ var2;
• unfold the de"nition of |≡• · · ·;
• move quanti"ers outermost;
• eliminate quanti"ers by instantiating the bodies with all possible labels;
• eliminate all “-1” operations by changing {{x}}⊆ I−1(y) to {{y}}⊆ I(x).
We illustrate the development for the following master constraint:
∀li ∈ Labi : {{inli}} ⊆ Rc(c)⇒ |≡•inli (2)
Straightforward application of the above operations gives rise to the following set of
conditional constraints:

({{inli}} ⊆ Rc(c)) ⇒
({{li}} ⊆ I(la)) ⇒
({{}} ⊆ H(li)) ⇒
({{la}} ⊆ I(la′)) ⇒
({{la′′}} ⊆ I(la′)) ⇒
({{}} ⊆ H(la′′)) ⇒
{{la}} ⊆ I(la′′)
li ∈ Labi ;
la ∈ Laba;
 ∈ SNam;
la
′ ∈ Laba;
la
′′ ∈ Laba


It turns out that this suFces for obtaining a polynomial time algorithm for computing
the least solution; however, in the interest of obtaining a qubic time algorithm we shall
“tile” the conditional constraints in the manner of [20]. To do so we introduce three
auxiliary relations:
• {{li}}⊆ IN () meaning that inli has been found to be “active”;
• {{la′′}}⊆NAM (li) meaning that li and la′′ have the same name;
• {{la}}⊆ SIB(la′′) meaning that la and la′′ are siblings.
(As will be shown below, their values are all derived from the estimate (I; H; C; R)
under consideration.)
The master constraint (2) then gives rise to a set of “local” constraints and three sets
of “global” constraints that are shared for all values of c occurring in (2). The set
of “local” constraints, generated for each occurrence of (2), computes the IN relation
from (I; H; C; R):
{({{inli}} ⊆ Rc(c))⇒ ({{li}} ⊆ IN ()) | li ∈ Labi}
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One of the sets of “global” constraints, shared for all occurrences of (2), computes the
NAM relation from (I; H; C; R):

({{}} ⊆ H(li)) ⇒
({{}} ⊆ H(la′′)) ⇒
{{la′′}} ⊆ NAM (li)
li ∈ Labi ;
 ∈ SNam;
la
′′ ∈ Laba


The other set of global constraints, shared for all occurrences of (2), computes the SIB
relation from (I; H; C; R):

({{la}} ⊆ I(la′)) ⇒
({{la′′}} ⊆ I(la′)) ⇒
{{la}} ⊆ SIB(la′′)
la ∈ Laba;
la
′ ∈ Laba;
la
′′ ∈ Laba


The "nal set of global constraints, shared for all occurrences of (2), performs the
update of I :

({{li}} ⊆ IN ()) ⇒
({{li}} ⊆ I(la)) ⇒ li ∈ Labi ;
({{la}} ⊆ SIB(la′′)) ⇒ la ∈ Laba;
({{la′′}} ⊆ NAM (li)) ⇒ la′′ ∈ Laba
{{la}} ⊆ I(la′′)


We proceed in a similar way for the other master constraints and write C<P=lme for the
set of conditional constraints obtained by expanding CP<P=lme. Once more we dispense
with formally de"ning what it means for a control #ow estimate (I; H; C; R) to satisfy
a set of conditional constraints since the idea is clear: the auxiliary relations (IN,
NAM, etc.) should be given as the least relations satisfying their de"ning constraints.
In analogy with Lemma 3 we then have the following result:
Lemma 4. (I; H; C; R) |=C<P=lme if and only if (I; H; C; R) |=lme P.
Table 8 shows for each form of master constraint how may instances are generated,
how many “local” conditional constraints are generated by expanding each occurrence
of a master constraint, and how many “global” conditional constraints are shared for
all master constraints of the form considered. The number of master constraints is
generally written as O(p)&O(q2) to indicate that both bounds O(p) and O(q2) ap-
ply as discussed previously; also note that only O(p)&O(q) master constraints in-
volve |≡• · · · since the relevant master constraints only contain one “free” symbol
from Lab∪Bnd∪SNam and similarly for two other types of master constraints. In
the example treated in detail, O(q) “local” conditional constraints are produced for
each occurrence of a master constraint and O(q3) “global” conditional constraints are
shared; without the use of “tiling” [20] we would have generated O(q5) constraints for
each occurrence of a master constraint.
Since q=O(p) it follows that constraint generation operates in time O(p3) produc-
ing O(p3) conditional constraints of size O(1). It is useful to observe that constraint
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Table 8
From master constraints to conditional constraints
Type of master constraint # Instances # “Local” # “Global”
{{l}}⊆ I(la) O(p)&O(q2) O(1) O(1)
{{}}⊆ I(la) O(p)&O(q2) O(1) O(1)
Rn⊆ H(l) O(p)&O(q2) O(q) O(1)
|≡• inl etc. O(p)&O(q) O(1) O(q3)
∀l∈Labi : {{inl}}⊆ Rc(c)⇒ { l}}⊆ I(la) etc. O(p)&O(q2) O(q) O(1)
∀l∈Labi : {{inl}}⊆ Rc(c)⇒ |≡• inl etc. O(p)&O(q) O(q) O(q3)
∀l∈ I−1(lc) : Rm⊆ Cc(l) etc. O(p)&O(q2) O(q) O(q3)
∀l∈ I−1(c) : Cc(l)⊆ Rc(c) etc. O(p)&O(q) O(q2) O(1)
generation can also be estimated as O(p+ q3) steps for generating O(q3) conditional
constraints of size O(1).
Constraint solving. We now consider how to turn C<P=lme into the smallest acceptable
analysis estimate (I; H; C; R). Perhaps the simplest approach is to use a Round Robin
algorithm (see e.g. [17, Chapter 6]). A more eFcient approach is based on worklist
algorithms (see e.g. [17, Chapter 6]) and makes sure to consider constraints only when
they are likely to have been enabled due to recent changes. This is the key idea behind
the approach of [11] and allows us to solve the conditional constraints in C<P=lme in
time proportional to their size.
Theorem 3 (Theorem 2 of [20]). The least control 3ow estimate;
{(I; H; C; R) | (I; H; C; R) |=lme P}
can be computed in cubic time.
Proof. Owing to Lemmas 3 and 4 we have
{(I; H; C; R) | (I; H; C; R) |=lme P} = {(I; H; C; R) | (I; H; C; R) |= C<P=lme}
and we already established that C<P=lme has size O(p3)&O(q3) and can be generated
in time O(p3)&O(p+ q3). Owing to the techniques of [11] the least solution can be
found in time proportional to the size of the constraint system.
A constructive algorithm for computing the least solution can be found in
Appendix A. Theorem 3 is attributed to [20] that developed “tiling” to establish a
similar result for the communication-free fragment of the ambient calculus; no new
complications were encountered when dealing with communication.
The cubic time bound is satisfying since this is the complexity of control #ow
analyses also for functional and object oriented languages where control #ow analysis
is used with success also on “medium-sized” programs (between 10 and 100 K lines
of code). Furthermore, since q can be chosen arbitrarily small (although at the cost of
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precision) this gives con"dence in exploring our current technology on fully realistic
internet programs.
4. Validating -rewalls
In the examples we have studied a notion of "rewall given by the passwords k, k′
and k′′ used for entering it. One aspect of being a "rewall is that agents in the approved
form must be allowed to enter. For the "rewall proposed in
Example 1 the approved form is k′C[open6k: k′′D[Q]] and in Example 2 we showed
that agents in this form can indeed enter the "rewall: Firewall |Agent→∗ (ww)wA[P|Q]
(assuming that w =∈ fn(Q)). It is shown in [7] that this can be strengthened to estab-
lish that Firewall |Agent is observationally equivalent to (ww)wA[P |Q] (assuming that
fn(P)∩{k; k′; k′′}= ∅= fn(Q)∩{w; k; k′; k′′}).
Another aspect of being a "rewall, not dealt with in [7], is to ensure that processes
not knowing the right passwords cannot enter. Due to the power of the ambient calculus
this is not as trivial as it might appear at "rst sight. As an example, a process that
does not initially know the passwords might nonetheless learn them by other means.
As another example, the "rewall might contain a trapdoor through which processes
might be able to enter (see Example 6 below).
Intuitively, we de"ne a process (or attacker) U to be unaware whenever fn(U )∩{k;
k′; k′′}= ∅. We then de"ne a proposed "rewall to be protective whenever the semantics
of Section 2 prevents it from allowing any unaware process to enter.
Example 6. Consider the proposed "rewall
Firewall ′: (ww)wA[kB[out1w:in2k′:in3w]|open4k′:open5k′′:P
|tE[out7w:in8w:open9q]|open10t]
that additionally contains a trapdoor t. It is easy to check that
Firewall ′ |Agent →∗ (ww)wA[· · · |P|Q];
using Agent of Example 1 (assuming that w =∈ fn(Q)). But now the unaware process
qF[in11t: Q] can also enter as is shown by
Firewall ′ | qF[in11t:Q]→∗ (ww)wA[· · · |P|Q]
(again assuming that w =∈ fn(Q)) unlike what was intended. This means that Firewall ′
is not a protective "rewall because it can be entered by a process not knowing the
right passwords.
In the development below we focus on one particular interface for "rewalls, as
given by the three passwords and formats shown above, but the development can be
adapted to other interfaces as well. With respect to the chosen interface we then aim
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at developing a safe test for when a proposed realisation, e.g. Firewall ′ or Firewall,
can be proved to be protective (i.e. to live up to the expectations).
We proceed by devising a test based on the control #ow analysis; to facilitate this we
need to formalise the notions of “proposed "rewall” and “unaware process” (or unaware
attacker) in the terminology of the control #ow analysis. In essense this amounts to
shifting our attention from names to stable names.
A proposed 5rewall is speci"ed by a tuple of the form
(me?; ((ww)wA[F]); k; k ′; k ′′)
such that (me?; n
l?
? [(w
w)wA[F]]) is a program. As in the examples we assume that
there are three passwords but the development can easily be adapted to an arbitrary
selection of passwords.
To enable the proposed "rewall to pass the test to be developed, it will be help-
ful to arrange that the naming environment respects the privacy of the name of the
"rewall, i.e. me−1? (w)= ∅, that the naming environment respects the uniqueness of the
passwords, i.e. me−1? (k)= {k}, me−1? (k ′)= {k′} and me−1? (k ′′)= {k′′}, and that the
process F does not contain any of the stable names w, k, k ′ or k ′′, although this is
not formally required.
For technical reasons we shall arrange that the proposed "rewall does not contain any
distinguished symbols (in particular those marked “•”) and that the naming environment
does not map any names to the distinguished stable name •; this can always be
achieved by adjusting the choice of distinguished symbols and by Fact 2 this has no
semantic consequences.
An unaware attacker (relative to the form of proposed "rewall considered here) is
a process U such that
(me?; n
l?
? [U ]) is a program, and
no free name in U is mapped to any of the “private” stable names,
i.e. {me?(n) | n∈ fn(U )}∩ {w; k; k ′; k ′′}= ∅.
When the above recommendations are adhered to, the second condition follows from
the assumption that none of the passwords k, k′ or k′′ are free in U . Note that the "rst
and second condition together establish the following stronger version of the second
condition: {me?(n) | n∈ fn(U )}∩ {?; w; k; k ′; k ′′}= ∅; we shall exploit this fact in the
proof of Proposition 1.
To develop a sound test for validating the protectiveness of a proposed "rewall (see
Table 9) we proceed in two stages. First recall that we de"ned a proposed "rewall to
be protective whenever the semantics prevents any unaware process from entering. The
"rst stage of the development then is to de"ne a related notion where the control #ow
analysis plays the role of the semantics: a "rewall is strongly protective whenever
the control #ow analysis is able to demonstrate that no unaware process can enter
the "rewall. It follows from the correctness of the control #ow analysis (Theorem 1)
that a strongly protective "rewall is also protective. Since the control #ow analysis
is approximate it would be unlikely for the converse result to hold; however, we
410 F. Nielson et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 283 (2002) 381–418
Table 9
Testing for protectiveness
INPUT: a proposed "rewall (me?; ((ww)wA[F]); k; k′; k′′)
without distinguished symbols in wA[F]
OUTPUT: “accept” or “reject”
METHOD: let {n1; : : : ; nm}= {n∈ dom(me?) |me?(n) =∈{?; w; k; k′; k′′}}
let n =∈ dom(me?) and x∈Varc and u∈Varn
construct U•? =


〈inli•n〉lc• | 〈outlo•n〉lc• | 〈openlp•n〉lc• |
(x
c
• ): (〈x〉lc• | x: 0) |
〈〈n〉〉ln• | 〈〈n1〉〉l
n
• | · · · | 〈〈nm〉〉ln• |
((u
n
• )): (〈〈u〉〉ln• | ula• [0] | inli•u | outlo•u | openlp• u)


construct U? = !(n• )(U•? | nl
a
• [U•? ])
compute the least (I; H; C; R) such that
(I; H; C; R) |=l?me? ((ww)wA[F]) |U?
if ∃la ∈Laba : la• ∈ I+(la) ∧ w∈H (la)
then “reject”
else “accept”
shall see that Firewall is both protective and strongly protective whereas Firewall ′ is
neither.
This then leads to the following interim suggestion for testing the strong protective-
ness of a proposed "rewall (me?; (((ww)wA[F]); k; k ′; k ′′):
if there exists an unaware attacker U such that
for the least (I; H; C; R) satisfying (I; H; C; R) |=l?me? ((ww)wA[F]) |U
there exists laU ∈Laba labelling an entity in U and la ∈Laba
such that laU ∈ I+(la) ∧ w∈H (la)
then “reject” else “accept”
While this test is sound it involves a search over an in"nity of unaware attackers and
so is not readily implementable. The second stage of the development therefore is to
restrict the search to a "nite set of unaware attackers that are as hard to protect against
as any other unaware attackers; in our case a single unaware attacker will do and it
is called the hardest attacker. It amounts to the process U? of Table 9. Clearly the
hardest attacker should have access to all stable names except those of ?; w; k; k ′; k ′′;
indeed, we ensure that only the stable name • is introduced internally. In a similar
way we ensure that only the binders c• and 
n
• and only the distinguished labels l
a
•, l
i
•,
lo•, l
p
• , lc• and l
n
• are used internally. Over this universe of names, binders and labels,
the hardest attacker must be able to perform all outputs of names, to create ambients
and capabilities with the required names, to output and input all kinds of capabilities
and to enact all relevant capabilities.
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It is hardly immediate that U? of Table 9 lives up to these expectations. However, we
are developing a sound test for strong protectiveness and so can restrict our attention to
the level of granularity embodied in the control #ow analysis. This allows us to prove
in Proposition 1 below that the de"nition of U? is suFciently general to capture the
behaviour of all unaware attackers—as far as the control #ow analysis is concerned.
Example 7. To test Firewall from Example 1 and Firewall ′ from Example 6 we need
to be more precise about the subprocess F ; in our tests we have used
!p[inp | outp | openp | p[0]]
(omitting labels) as an example of an unrestricted internal process. Then Firewall passes
the test because H−1(w)= {A} and la• =∈ I+(A) but Firewall ′ fails the test because
H−1(w)= {A} and la• ∈ I+(A).
As explained above the correctness of the test hinges on the following key result; it
shows that, from the point of view of the analysis, it is as hard to protect a "rewall
against the process U? of Table 9 as it is to protect it against any other unaware
process U . The formulation uses the operation U also used to express Fact 2: all
stable names, binders and labels are replaced by the appropriate distinguished stable
names, binders and labels.
Proposition 1. Let (me?; ((ww)wA[F]); k; k ′; k ′′) be a proposed 5rewall as demanded
in Table 9 and let (I; H; C; R) be as in Table 9. Then
(I; H; C; R) |=l?me ((ww)wA[F]) | U
whenever U is an unaware attacker.
Proof. The proof is divided into two parts. The "rst draws a number of consequences
from the fact that (I; H; C; R) |=l?me? U? and the second proves a number of “general”
results from which (I; H; C; R) |=l?me? U immediately follows.
Part 1. For the "rst part we unfold the formula de"ning (I; H; C; R) |=l?me? U?. Since
U •? appears outermost as well as inside n
la• [· · ·] we get:
I(l?) ⊇ {la•; li•; lo•; lp• ; lc•; ln•; c•; n•}
I(la•) ⊇ {la•; li•; lo•; lp• ; lc•; ln•; c•; n•} (3)
In the "rst two lines of U •? we output all three kinds of capabilities and then input them
again; similarly in the last two lines we output all the stable names •; me?(n1); : : : ; me?
(nm) accessible to U •? and then input them again; this yields:
Rc(c•) ⊇ {inl
i
• ; outl
o
• ; openl
p
•}
Rn(n•) ⊇ {•; me?(n1); : : : ; me?(nm)} (4)
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More generally, the fact that we input what has been output, ensures that the clauses
for input of Table 4 establish the following containments:
∀la ∈ I−1(c•) : Cc(la) ⊆ Rc(c•)
∀la ∈ I−1(n•) : Cn(la) ⊆ Rn(n•) (5)
In a similar way we also make sure to output what has just been input and the clauses
for output of Table 4 then establish the “dual” containments:
∀la ∈ I−1(lc•) : Cc(la) ⊇ Rc(c•)
∀la ∈ I−1(ln•) : Cn(la) ⊇ Rn(n•) (6)
In the second line of U •? we perform the capability just input; since this takes place
both outermost and inside nl
a
• [· · ·], the clause for capabilities gives
∀m˜ ∈ Rc(c•) : ∀l ∈ {l?; la•} : (I; H; C; R)|≡lm˜; (7)
since the M˜ used for validating x: 0 must satisfy M˜ ⊇ Rc(c•). Similarly, in the fourth
line of U •? we construct ambients and capabilities with the names just input; this yields:
Rn(n•) ⊆ H (la•);
Rn(n•) ⊆ H (li•);
Rn(n•) ⊆ H (lo•);
Rn(n•) ⊆ H (lp•);
(8)
since the N˜ used for validating ul
a
• [0] must satisfy N˜ ⊇ Rn(n•) and similarly for the
three capabilities.
Part 2. We now consider the second part of the proof. We shall say that a naming
environment me is acceptable for the process P whenever it de"nes all names and
variables in P, i.e. fv(P)∪ fn(P)⊆ dom(me), and whenever it only maps variables and
names to “acceptable” symbols:
range(me) ⊆ {•; me?(n1); : : : ; me?(nm); c•; n•}:
In a similar way we de"ne the acceptability of me for a capability M and a naming N .
First we prove for all me and N that
(I; H; C; R)||≡meN : Rn(n•)
provided me is acceptable for N; (9)
where (I; H; C; R) is as above. The proof is by inspection of the two cases for N . The
case n is immediate given (4) and the acceptability of me. The case u is trivial.
Next, we prove for all me and M that
(I; H; C; R)|¿meM : Rc(c•)
provided me is acceptable for M; (10)
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where again (I; H; C; R) is as above. The proof is by structural induction in M. In the
cases inl
i
•N , outl
o
•N and openl
p
•N we take N˜ =Rn(n•); the result is then immediate
from (9), (4) and (8). The cases x and  are trivial and the case M1:M2 is immediate
from the induction hypothesis.
Finally we prove for all me and P that
∀l ∈ {l?; la•} : (I; H; C; R) |=lme P
whenever me is acceptable for P (11)
and where (I; H; C; R) once more is as above. The proof is by structural induction in
P. The case (n•)P follows from the induction hypothesis (since me[n → •]
is acceptable for P). The cases 0, P | P′ and !P are immediate using the
induction hypothesis. In the case Nl
a
• [P] we choose N˜ =Rn(n•); the result then is
a consequence of the induction hypothesis, (3), (9) and (8). In the case M: P we
take M˜ =Rc(c•); the result then follows from the induction hypothesis, (10) and (7).
In the case for 〈M 〉lc• we take M˜ =Rc(c•); the result then is a consequence of (3),
(10) and (6). In the case for 〈〈N 〉〉ln• we take N˜ =Rn(n•); the result then follows from
(3), (9) and (6). The case (x
c
•): P is a consequence of the induction hypothesis
(since me[x → c•] is acceptable), (3) and (5). The case ((u
n
•)): P follows from the
induction hypothesis (since me[u → n•] is acceptable), (3) and (5).
Returning to the unaware process U we observe that
{me?(n) | n ∈ fn(U )} ⊆ {me?(n1); : : : ; me?(nm)}
and it then follows from (11) and Fact 4 that me? can be restricted so as to be
acceptable for U ; this gives (I; H; C; R) |=l?me? U as desired.
When (ww)wA[F] passes the test and U is an unaware process we want to show
that no subambient of U ever passes inside w. Informally, this will take the form
of assuming that ((ww)wA[F]) |U→∗ S and guaranteeing that S contains no subam-
bient wl
a
1 [· · · ula2 [· · ·] · · ·] where u comes from U . To formalise this we shall avail
ourselves of Fact 2 that allows us to arrange the labelling to suit our needs. Indeed,
if ((ww)wA[F]) |U→∗ S then ((ww)wA[F]) | U→∗ S ′ for some S ′ such that S=
S ′.
Theorem 4. Suppose that (ww)wA[F] passes the test of Table 9 and that U is an un-
aware process; if ((ww)wA[F]) | U→∗ S then S contains no subterm nla11 [· · · nl
a
2
2 [· · ·]
· · ·] where n1 has stable name w and la2 is la•.
Proof. Letting (I; H; C; R) be as in Table 9, it follows from Proposition 1 that (I; H; C; R)
|=l?me? ((ww)wA[F]) | U. Then (I; H; C; R) |=l?me? S follows from Theorem 1. Suppose
next, for the sake of contradiction, that S does contain a subprocess nl
a
1
1 [· · · nl
a
2
2 [· · ·] · · ·]
where n1 has stable name w and la2 is l
a
•. Then it follows from (I; H; C; R) |=l?me? S that
la• ∈ I+(la1) ∧ w∈H (la1) showing that the test could not have been passed.
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Theorem 5. The test in Table 9 operates in cubic time.
Proof. Given a "rewall of size O(p) we may without loss of generality assume that the
set {n1; : : : ; nm} of variables constructed in Table 9 does not contain any variables not
in the "rewall; this ensures that also ((ww)wA[F]) |U? will have size O(p). It follows
from Theorem 3 that the least solution can be found in time O(p + q3) where, as
before, q is the number of elements of Lab∪Bnd∪SNam. This dominates the O(q3)
operations needed to calculate the transitive closure I+ of the relation I . Hence the
overall operation of Table 9 is O(p3)&O(p+ q3) where p is the size of the "rewall
and q=O(p) can be chosen “arbitrarily” small.
In summary, we have succeeded in using the control #ow analysis to devise a cubic
time algorithm for correctly validating that a proposed "rewall is indeed protective;
unlike [18] this development applies to the full ambient calculus. By judicious choice
of the sets of labels, binders and markers the test can be performed in near-linear
time (although at the cost of precision); this gives con"dence in exploring our current
approach on fully realistic internet programs.
5. Conclusion
Static analysis provides a summary of the behaviour of programs; we have shown
that classical control #ow analysis techniques can be adapted to tackle the much more
dynamic setting of the ambient calculus. Our #ow logic approach facilitates fully auto-
matic validation of an analysis estimate as well as fully automatic computation of the
best estimate; in spirit this is rather similar to the approaches of type inference. Type
systems have already been extensively used to study the properties of web-based lan-
guages and related calculi (e.g. [1, 8]); the use of #ow logic oEers a #exible approach
to adapting the vast amount of more “traditional” approaches to static analysis [17].
In this paper we developed a control #ow analysis for the ambient calculus building
on recent developments for the -calculus [2–4] and the ambient calculus
[14, 18, 19, 22]. In fact a notion of cryptography is implicitly part of the ambient cal-
culus as presented here. As in the spi-calculus it is the restriction operator that is used
to model “secrets” that cannot be guessed by brute force attack. Thus a message M ,
encrypted under the key K , is represented simply as the ambient K [M ] whereas an
attempt at decrypting such a message is represented by the ambient openK . If K is
a secret only known to the principals P1; : : : ; Pn the entire system is represented as
(K )(P1| · · · |Pn) where each Pi may contain K [M ] as well as openK .
More importantly we demonstrated how a careful exploitation of the detailed opera-
tion of the control #ow analysis allowed us to construct an attacker that was as hard to
protect against as any other attacker; this is somewhat reminiscent of the identi"cation
of hard problems in a given complexity class. This allowed us to predict the opera-
tion of the "rewall in conjunction with all unaware attackers based on its operation in
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conjunction with the hardest attacker; if it successfully protects against the hard attacker
it will also protect against all other attackers not knowing the required passwords. We
believe this to be typical of applications where software developed by subcontractors is
validated before being embedded in the software system under construction. To make
this practical we ensured that the test could be performed in cubic time.
It is important to stress that we circumvent the undecidability of dealing with all
possible execution contexts, in particular all attackers, by coarsening the “level of gran-
ularity” of our observations to coincide with those of the static analysis. We maintain
soundness because we proved the static analysis to be sound (but of course not com-
plete) with respect to the dynamic semantics.
The analysis leading to the hardest attacker can be compared with the approaches of
the “Dolev–Yao tradition” [10], including [5, 23, 12]. Indeed, the analyses performed
in these studies amount to an “informal” analysis of the capabilities of the attacker,
leading to an inductively de"ned behaviour. Such an analysis is not straightforward
when the computational capabilities are modi"ed, such as when adding mobility. The
advantage of our approach therefore is two-fold. On the one hand, it allows us to make
the analysis in a “formal” manner, because we can prove theorems with respect to the
dynamic semantics (as mitigated by the analysis). On the other hand, the techniques
used to implement the analysis provide insights on how to de"ne the capabilities of
the hardest attacker.
In summary, we have illustrated a novel approach to the validation of safety and
security properties of software systems. We are hopeful that it will scale up to other
calculi and web-based languages with explicit cryptographic primitives. By consider-
ing #ow logics that express more powerful analyses it is likely that one can capture
attackers in a more precise manner; perhaps one can show that the "rewall protects
againsts attackers knowing only some of the secret passwords or even against attackers
knowing all the secret passwords but unable to use them in the appropriate manner (as
might be the case for an agent representing a “courier” service).
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Appendix A. Constraint solving
We now consider how to turn a set C of conditional constraints of size |C| into
the smallest acceptable analysis estimate. To this end we develop a worklist algorithm
(see e.g. [17, Chapter 6]). It operates on data structures R1; : : : ; Rm corresponding to a
constant number of binary relations. Additionally, it makes use of a list stack of “bit
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positions” that have just been set to 1 and whose consequences remain to be explored,
a table CT that maps constraint numbers to the constraint in question, and a table INFL
that for each “bit position” gives a list of constraint numbers in#uenced by that “bit
position”. We operate on lists using the constructors CONS and NIL and the destructors
HEAD and TAIL. To operate on stack we make use of the function push for setting
a “bit position” to 1 and for placing the “bit position” on stack, and of the function
pop for returning the topmost “bit position” on stack and at the same time removing
it from stack.
The worklist algorithm is displayed in Table 10. The initialisation of R1; : : : ; Rm
amounts to setting (R1; : : : ; Rm) equal to the least element (⊥; : : : ;⊥) of the appropriate
lattice of values. The initialisation next sets stack and all INFL[set,var] to NIL and
then computes the correct contents of the structures stack, CT and INFL by iterating
through all conditional constraints in C. The iteration phase amounts to propagating “bit
positions” as long as there are new “bit positions” recently set to 1 whose consequences
need to be explored. We write <set= and <variable= whenever we interpret the entities set
and var as denoting values and variables, i.e. whenever they are used for comparisons
or for updating the data structures. The algorithm clearly terminates because no “bit
position” is placed twice on stack thanks to the test performed by the push operation.
We can now state the correctness of the worklist algorithm:
Lemma A.1. Table 10 computes {(R1; : : : ; Rm) | (R1; : : : ; Rm) |=C}.
Proof. Write (⊥; : : : ;⊥) for the least element and write
(R•1 ; : : : ; R
•
m) = {(R1; : : : ; Rm) | (R1; : : : ; Rm) |= C}
for the least solution (guaranteed by the obvious extension of Theorem 2). It follows
from the “Horn clause” format of the conditional constraints that the invariant
(⊥; : : : ;⊥)  (R1; : : : ; Rm)  (R•1 ; : : : ; R•m)
remains ful"lled throughout the iteration. Next write (R1; : : : ; Rm) for the resulting value.
It follows from the above that
(R1; : : : ; Rm)  (R•1 ; : : : ; R•m)
and since it is clear that all constraints in C are ful"lled upon termination it follows
that
(R1; : : : ; Rm) |= C:
Using the de"nition of (R•1 ; : : : ; R
•
m) we then have
(R1; : : : ; Rm) = {(R1; : : : ; Rm) | (R1; : : : ; Rm) |= C}
showing that the algorithm computes the least solution.
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Table 10
Worklist solution of constraints
GIVEN: a bounded number of binary relations R1; : : : ; Rm,
and a bound on the size of each conditional constraint.
INPUT: a set C of conditional constraints over the binary relations.
OUTPUT: the least solution (R1; : : : ; Rm) such that (R1; : : : ; Rm) |=C.
INITIALISE: for i := 1 to m do
for each argument arg occurring in C do
Ri(arg) := ∅;
for each set⊆ var occurring in C do
INFL[set,var] := NIL;
cno := 0; stack := NIL;
for each setk ⊆ vark ⇒ · · · set1⊆ var1⇒ set0⊆ var0 in C do
cno := cno + 1;
CT[cno] := (setk ⊆ vark ⇒ · · · set1⊆ var1⇒ set0⊆ var0);
if k = 0 then push((set0; var0)) else
for i := 1 to k do
INFL[seti,vari] := CONS(cno, INFL[seti,vari]);
ITERATE: while stack 	= NIL do
let (set; var) = pop() in
for cno in INFL[set,var] do
let (setk ⊆ vark ⇒ · · · set1⊆ var1⇒ set0⊆ var0) = CT[cno] in
if
∧k
i=1 <seti =⊆ <vari = then push((set0; var0)) else skip;
USING: procedure push((set; var)) is
if <set=⊆ <var= then skip else
<var= := <var=∪ <set=; stack := CONS((set; var),stack);
function pop() is
let (set; var) = HEAD(stack) in
stack := TAIL(stack); return((set; var));
To state the complexity of the worklist algorithm we assume that there is a constant
bound on the size of the conditional constraints occurring in C:
Lemma A.2 (Special case of [11]). Table 10 operates in time O(|C|).
Proof. The initialisation of R1; : : : ; Rm takes time O(|C|). Setting INFL[set,var] to NIL
also takes time O(|C|). The remaining initialisation performs O(1) steps for each of
the O(|C|) conditional constraints (recalling that k =O(1), i.e. the length of conditions
is bounded by a constant). For the iteration at most O(|C|) “bit positions” are placed
on the stack thanks to the test performed by the push operation and to the fact
that a “bit position” set to 1 is never reset to 0 given the “Horn clause” format of
the conditional constraints. Ignoring the inspection of INFL[set,var] we therefore use
time O(|C|). The inspection of INFL[set,var] can be amortised over all iterations
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since each constraint is only considered O(1) times (again because k =O(1)) and thus
takes overall time O(|C|).
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